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ABSTRACT 
With the added security provided by LTE, geographical location has become an important factor for authentication to 
enhance the security of remote client authentication during mCommerce applications using Smartphones. Tight 
combination of geographical location with classic authentication factors like PINs/Biometrics in a real-time, remote 
verification scheme over the LTE layer connection assures the authenticator about the client itself (via PIN/biometric) as 
well as the client’s current location, thus defines the important aspects of “who”, “when”, and “where” of the 
authentication attempt without eaves dropping or man on the middle attacks. To securely integrate location as an 
authentication factor into the remote authentication scheme, client’s location must be verified independently, i.e. the 
authenticator should not solely rely on the location determined on and reported by the client’s Smartphone. The latest 
wireless data communication technology for mobile phones (4G LTE, Long-Term Evolution), recently being rolled out 
in various networks, can be employed to enhance this location-factor requirement of independent location verification. 
LTE’s Control Plane LBS provisions, when integrated with user-based authentication and independent source of 
localisation factors ensures secure efficient, continuous location tracking of the Smartphone. This feature can be 
performed during normal operation of the LTE-based communication between client and network operator resulting in 
the authenticator being able to verify the client’s claimed location more securely and accurately. Trials and experiments 
show that such algorithm implementation is viable for nowadays Smartphone-based banking via LTE communication. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Smartphones are becoming a major part in everybody’s daily life. All kinds of mCommerce activities, including financial 
banking transactions and online shopping, are nowadays performed online via Smartphone applications whilst on the 
move. The wide availability of mCommerce applications on Smartphones creates new challenges in protecting these 
applications and the authentication process itself, and therefore demands secure and reliable remote client verification. In 
remote authentication, the authenticator does not have a direct knowledge about the “who, when, and where” of the 
remote client. Instead, only the remotely received client authentication factors are available. 
Beside the classical authentication factors like PINs or passwords, location information becomes a more and more 
important factor in remote client authentication as location information grounds the client’s authentication attempt to a 
specific and clearly defined position on earth. However, the secure integration and verification of the client’s location 
information during the authentication process is difficult and should be performed independently from the client’s 
Smartphone to avoid manipulation. To achieve these aims, this paper proposes a novel scheme that combines LTE-based 
location provisions of Smartphones with a smart authentication process to assure secure mCommerce (e.g. bank 
transactions) with minimum overhead. LTE-location services are used to independently verify the client’s claimed 
location (based on the position determined by the Smartphone’s on-board GNSS receiver), i.e. the client based location 
information will be cross-checked with the location information independently determined via the LTE-location services 
provided by the mobile network operator. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview about the current use of location 
information as an authentication factor and gives further background information about the LTE technology. Section 3 
details the proposed location-based, multi-factor authentication scheme and explains the security and implementation 
  
 
 
enhancements resulting from the integration of LTE to establish and verify the client’s location. Section 4 concludes this 
paper and gives recommendations towards future work. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
2.1 Using Client’s Location Information to enhanced authentication security 
Up until very recently, clients were authenticated in the majority of mCommerce applications via a combination of one 
or more classic (i.e. knowledge-, object-, or identity-based) authentication factors [1]. 
1) Knowledge-based authentication (or “something you know”) uses a piece of information memorised by the client, 
e.g. a password. This type of authentication offers very strong authentication security, if the chosen passwords are 
random and long. However, memorising these long and random passwords has been shown very difficult for many 
users in practical applications. This has often led to very short and consequently simple to guess passwords. 
Additionally, passwords are often re-used, which makes cross-application attacks easier [2]. 
2) Object-based authentication (or “something you have”) relies on the physical ownership of an object (token), e.g. an 
ATM card or a passport. This type of authentication has the advantage over knowledge-based authentication that the 
client does not need to memorise any information and that the authentication information stored within the object 
can be as complex as required without negatively effecting the client. However, object-based authentication has two 
main disadvantages when it comes especially to remote authentication scenarios. First, if the token gets lost or 
stolen, the security of the system is entirely vanished. Second, and this aspect is mainly relevant in remote 
authentication scenarios, the remote authenticator cannot verify the actual possession of the token. Instead, he can 
only verify the transmitted authentication information stored originally on the token. However, this might have been 
illicitly copied in a previous attack, e.g. via a manipulated ATM machine [3]. 
3)  Identity-based / Biometric authentication (or “something you are”) relies on the unique and individual behavioural 
(e.g. gait, voice) or physiological (e.g. fingerprint, face) characteristics of a person. Biometrics offer the advantages 
over the other two classical authentication factors that the client does not need to memorise a password or might lose 
the token. However, biometric samples can be collected and re-used to fool the biometric verification sensor, e.g. the 
genuine client’s face can be used by an offender from a previously taken image. 
 
To enhance the security and reliability of remote, multi-factor authentication systems further, additional authentication 
factors like time and location were added to such systems [4]. Adding time information that is tightly bound to the other 
authentication factors eliminates the risk that genuine authentication data can be illicitly re-used at later stages by an 
attacker, e.g. the risk of replay attacks with intercepted client data is minimised. Integration of location information 
grounds the remote authentication attempt to a clearly and uniquely defined position on earth [5], thus eliminating the 
possibility that an attacker can claim to be at a location, s/he actually is not, i.e. distance attacks are minimised. 
To use location information as an authentication factor, the authenticator must be able to verify the correctness and 
actuality of the client’s claimed location [6]. To achieve this, two general approaches can be distinguished: 
1) The client collects location proofs from trusted sources and submits these location proofs [7] to the authenticator for 
verification once the client’s current location needs to be verified, i.e. the client proactively submits his location 
claim to the authenticator for verification. 
2) The authenticator determines the actual client location via a second resource that is independent from the technology 
used by the client, i.e. the authenticator independently requests the client’s current location and does not rely on the 
location information provided by the client. 
 
Examples of the former approach are systems like APPLAUS [8] or Data-Location-Time (DTL) – certificates [9]. These 
systems depend on the widespread of trusted proof issuers, e.g. WiFi-Access Points, with known locations. Here, the 
main idea is that the client is only able to collect such location proofs from the proof issuer, if in communication range of 
  
 
 
the proof issuers. However, these systems introduce various requirements and limitations, which need to be carefully 
addressed to avoid that the authentication system security is undermined. The number of trusted senders needs to be high 
enough as well as adequately distributed to guarantee the necessary precision of the location information. It must also be 
guaranteed that the trusted senders cannot be modified in such a way that they generate wrong location proofs. The 
issued location proofs also have to be protected against modification. Because these proofs are stored on the client’s 
Smartphone, they are subject to potential manipulation if not protected. Finally, such systems need to guarantee that the 
issued location proofs cannot be passed on to another person or be re-used at a later time. 
In the later approach, the claimed client location is verified via a second, completely independent source. For example, 
the LocBiometrics system [4] uses GPS on the client’s Smartphone to determine the client’s current position. This 
location information is then tightly coupled with further authentication factors, e.g. a password and client’s biometrics, 
and afterwards sent via a wireless communication link to the authenticator. Upon receiving the authentication 
information, the authenticator requests the current client location from the Mobile Network Operator (MNO, i.e. the 
second source) serving the client’s Smartphone at that moment in time. The authenticator then uses his stored client 
credentials together with the location information received from the MNO to authentication the client and its location. A 
clear advantage of this independent location verification is that the location proof will never be available to the client, 
and accordingly cannot be directly manipulated. Also, the already existing cellular network infrastructure can be used to 
determine the client’s location, no installation and observation of further trusted senders is necessary. 
 
2.2 LTE-Location Services (LTE-LS) Architecture 
Figure 1 shows the LTE-Location Service (LTE-LS) architecture used by the external LTE-LS user (e.g. the Bank, step 
1) to determine/request the current location of the client (i.e. the LTE-User, step 8). Once the bank requires the location 
of the Smartphone used in the transaction for verification (step 1), the bank sends an LTE-LS request (step 2) to the 
Gateway Mobile Location Centre (GMLC, step 3), which acts as the first contact point for external location requests. 
The GMLC then determines the identity of the Mobility Management Entity (MME) currently serving the client’s 
Smartphone from the Home Subscriber Server (HSS, step 4) and forwards the LTE-LS request to the determined MME 
(step 5). The HSS acts here as a central database for mobility management, call and session establishment support, and 
holds also LTE-User related subscription information. The MME then deputes the task of calculating the actual 
Smartphone location to the Evolved Serving Mobile Location Centre (ESMLC, step 6), which will use the Secure User 
Plane Location (SUPL, cp. section 2.3) protocol (step 7) to establish the current position of the client’s Smartphone using 
the Evolved Node B (eNodeB). The eNodeB is a basestation connected to the mobile phone network. It controls the 
Smartphones in one or more mobile network cells, and communicates directly with the client’s Smartphone. Once the 
client’s position is securely established, the determined position information is returned to the GMLC. Finally, an LTE-
LS response is generated and communicated back to the bank (step 9). 
 
 
Figure 1: LTE Location Service Architecture (adopted from [10]) 
 
  
 
 
2.3 LTE Secure User Plane Location (SUPL) protocol 
Since the initial FCC-E911 mandate, researchers have explored the use of a Secure User Plane Location (SUPL) protocol 
that is network technology (e.g. 2G-GSM or 3G-WCDMA) independent to carry the localisation information of any user 
and so enabling a solution for e911 and other Location Based Services (LBS). With the emergence of the LTE 
technology, since release 9, a SUPL has been included that will offer secure Smartphone based positioning based on one 
or more of the following four techniques: 
 
1) Using Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS, currently including GPS, Galileo & Glonass) where assistance-
data (for GPS this data includes Almanac, ephemeris, time, error measurements that can help establish time and 
frequency) is supplied to the Smartphone’s GNSS receiver(s) and associate position-fix is relayed back to any client 
via the ESMLC (Evolved Serving Mobile Location Centre, which also supply the assistance data). Accuracy of such 
fix can be within 10 meters. 
2) Using Smartphone assisted positioning where the raw data from the on-board GNSS receivers are sent to the 
ESMLC to calculate the phone’s position before passing it on to a client with an accuracy of 10meters 
3) Using the serving towers/basestations to calculate the position of the Smartphone using the Observed Time 
Difference Of Arrival (OTDOA) technique. A special positioning sub-frames called “Positioning Reference Signals” 
has been included in release 9, to help accurately measure the time difference of arrival of neighbouring cells 
received signal, achieving accuracies to within 100meters 
4) Using Enhanced cell-ID technique of measuring the distance between the Smartphone and the serving tower, based 
on the received signal round trip time (or the Angle of Arrival of the uplink signal) between the eNodeB and the 
Smartphone, and then calculating that the phone is within a circle of that distance radius. 
 
Also, a new LTE Positioning Protocol (LPP) is available that will supports broadband, such as WiFi, based position 
techniques, too. LPP can therefore be used in the Control Plane (similar to RRC/RRLP in 2G/3G networks) or used in 
the User Plan enabled by SUPL. This makes LTE versatile in establishing the location of any user’s Smartphone over 
any network via LPP on the Control Plane (commonly used by emergency services as only way in 2G/3G networks) and 
via SUPL with RRLP or LLP as used in the proposed location-based authentication scheme detailed in the following 
section 3. 
 
3. LTE ENHANCED LOCATION-BASED MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION 
 
3.1 Overview of the proposed scheme 
The proposed LTE enhanced location-based multi-factor authentication scheme improves the security and reduces the 
overhead of authentication systems with independent location verification (e.g. LocBiometrics [4], cp. section 2.1) by 
integrating LTE-LS (cp. section 2.2) into the authentication process. Figure 2 shows how the GNSS-based (client side) 
and LTE-LS-based location information (authenticator side) is determined and combined with the further authentication 
factors (e.g. client’s biometrics and PIN) during the authentication message generation as well as the verification 
process.  
On the client side, the location-based, multi-factor authentication data is combined from freshly captured client 
biometrics, a client entered PIN as well as the current Smartphone location determined using the Smartphone’s on-board 
GNSS receiver as detailed in [4]. On the authenticator side, this LTE enhanced authentication scheme requests the 
client’s current location for independent verification via LTS-LS from the GMLC (cp. section 2.2). I.e. the MNO 
supplied LTE-LS location of the Smartphone, which is determined using the secured and unique to LTE Observed Time 
Difference Of Arrival (OTDOA) technique (cp. section 2.3), is compared to the GNSS (e.g. GPS) position obtained by 
the client’s Smartphone. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Location-based, multi-factor authentication scheme 
 
Figure 3 shows the verification process on the authenticator side in more detail. After the client provided authentication 
factors are extracted from the received authentication message (step 1), the provided location is compared to a set of pre-
agreed areas, the client normally uses his/her Smartphone in (step 2). This optional step enables the authenticator in a 
quick and easy way to check if something unusual/suspicious is going on with this authentication attempt. Once this first 
check is successfully performed, the actual client location is requested by the authenticator via LTE-LS request (step 3). 
The received location information is verified (step 4). If the difference between the two locations is outside the pre-
defined threshold, then the authentication attempt is rejected, otherwise the verification process continues. In the final 
verification step 6, the remaining client-based authentication factors (e.g. Biometrics and PIN) are compared to the 
stored client credentials retrieved from the corresponding database (step 5). Please note, that the client’s credentials have 
been stored in the authenticator’s database during an enrolment process executed prior to authentication. If the result of 
the verification process is also within a pre-defined threshold, then this scheme considers the client entire authentication 
data as genuine and the overall authentication attempt is successful. Otherwise, if one of the verification steps is not 
successful, then the entire authentication attempt is rejected. 
 
 
Figure 3: Verification process on authenticator side 
  
 
 
3.2 Detailed LTE-LS location request procedure 
Figure 4 details the steps executed by the MNO following an LTE-LS request from the authenticator (e.g. the bank) to 
establish the client’s current location. This is done, once the supplied location-based multi-factor authentication data 
received from the Smartphone has been decoded (cp. step 1 in Figure 3) and the GNSS coordinates were recovered and 
checked to prove that the Smartphone is within the area supplied by the MNO OTDOA data (cp. step 2 in Figure 3). 
Now, the MNO is asked to supply the actual GNSS coordinate (step 1). The bank’s request is passed on to the GMLC, 
which will retrieve the IMSI code of the Smartphone (step 2). Then the request is checked for validity and it is also 
validated if this client’s privacy permissions allow determining his current location (step 3). This additional LTE-LS 
privacy feature can be used in combination with other privacy preserving authentication techniques, such as [11], to meet 
the privacy protecting aspects required in any remote authentication scheme. The GMLC will recover the ID of the 
serving MME from HSS (steps 4 and 5), using the basic Diameter (Diam) protocol [12], a standard IETF protocol for 
authentication, authorisation and accounting. In the following step 6, the GMLC forwards to location request directly to 
that MME to retrieve the location of the Smartphone. 
 
 
Figure 4: LTE-LS location request procedure (adopted from [13] and [10]) 
 
  
 
 
Before the actual location of the client’s Smartphone is determined, the MME can optionally ask the client for his/her 
permission (step 7) using the Supplementary Service (SS) protocol. If the client did not initiate the mCommerce 
authentication request in the first place, s/he can intervene at this point during the location determination process (step 8), 
and withhold his/her permission to continue the process (step 9). However, in the case that the initial authentication 
request was send from the client, permission will be granted and the MME will continue the process. 
The MME forwards the location request to the ESMLC (step 10) using the LTE-LS Application Protocol (LTE-LS AP), 
which recovers the capabilities of the Smartphone from the information stored about the Smartphone in the ESMLC 
database. If the Smartphone has GNSS receivers on-board, then the GSMLC will provide aiding data (such as Almanac, 
Ephemeris, time, rough position and frequency for a GPS system) for these receivers’ technologies on-board the 
Smartphone and directly obtain the corresponding receiver’s coordinates. If instructed or the Smartphone has no GNSS 
receivers enabled on-board, then the ESMLC will use OTDOA, or enhanced-Cell-ID if the phone is in a remote location. 
The LTE Positioning Protocol (LPP, cp. section 2.3) is used to exchange the actual determined location between the 
client’s Smartphone and the ESMLC in steps 11 and 12. Finally, the location is send via ESMLC (step 13), MME (step 
14), and GMLC bank to the bank (i.e. the initial requester of the LTE-LS) in step 15.  
 
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Location has become an important authentication factor in remote authentication scenarios as for example required in 
financial transactions performed on Smartphones. Adding location information grounds the remote authentication 
attempt to a clearly specified position on earth, i.e. minimises the risk of distance attacks. To achieve the highest possible 
security and reliability of the location authentication factor within the authentication system, the location claimed by the 
client should be independently verified via a second source at the authenticator side. 
The LTE-location service architecture provides a secure and trustworthy way to achieve these authentication 
requirements with minimal technical and time overhead. In addition, the privacy checks and user intervention stage 
integrated in the LTE-LS architecture can be efficiently used to address the high privacy demands of today’s 
authentication schemes. In tight combination with other authentication factors like PINs or biometrics as proposed in this 
paper, LTE verified location can be used to limit the fraud-attack possibilities and avoid certain distance attacks 
commonly existing in various identity theft scenarios with minimum overhead. 
The work on using the new LTE-location services for secure authentication purposes is on-going. Currently, further 
schemes which combine the authentication factors with the LTE-LS provided location in a more robust ways are 
investigated. Also, the use of LTE-LS to securely and reliably generate location-based keys, for example to be used to 
protect mCommerce applications executed on Smartphones against illegitimate modification [14], are explored. 
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